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 I. Introduction 
 It is easy for competition policy1 enthusiasts (like myself) to get carried away and go 
overboard in extolling the merits of good competition policy.  It is tempting to claim that good 
competition policy is the cure for everything that ails any economy. 
 It is tempting -- but it is wrong.  Good competition policy clearly can be of substantial 
benefit to an economy.  But it is not a "cure-all"; and to claim otherwise is to "over-sell" competition 
policy, which surely is not in the long-run interests of its advocates.  At the same time, however, 
competition policy should not be "under-sold" either; it is surely more than just a minor adjunct to 
other policies that are in a government's tool bag. 
 This essay will address the role of competition policy in promoting economic growth.  
Competition policy clearly does have a role -- an important role, in my view -- to play.  However, in 
the spirit of the "middle path" that I have just expounded, I will try neither to over-sell nor to under-
sell the importance of that role. 
 The remainder of this essay will proceed as follows:  Section II provides a brief overview of 
the important components of a sensible competition policy.  Section III will sketch the range of 
policies that contribute to economic growth; this review will clarify the contribution that competition 
policy can make through its effects in helping promote other policies, as well as its direct effects in 
                         
     * The author was the Chief Economist in the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, 
1982-1983. 
     1 Throughout this paper the terms "competition policy" and "antitrust policy" (which is the term 
that is more common in American usage) will be used interchangeably. 
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promoting competition and thereby promoting economic efficiency.  Section IV then addresses the 
question of "industrial policy" and its juxtaposition with competition policy.  Section V will review 
the growing importance of economics and economists for competition policy in the U.S. and will 
highlight some recent (in the past few decades) advances in U.S. competition policy to which 
economists have contributed and that have caused competition policy to be more in consonance with 
the goal of promoting economic efficiency and thereby contributing to economic growth; this 
section will also offer some suggestions for additional improvements that could promote the cause of 
economic efficiency (and economic growth) even further.  Section VI will offer a brief conclusion. 
 Throughout this essay, I will be drawing on the experience of the United States in 
formulating and implementing its competition policy.  Partly this is because the U.S. has the longest 
experience of any country in the world with respect to the formulation and implementation of 
competition policy; partly this is because the U.S. has hitherto tended to be a leader (among those 
countries with competition policies) in new developments in competition policy;2 and partly this is 
because I am most familiar with the policies of the U.S.  Also, I will be emphasizing the perspective 
of economics with respect to these policies, since that too is the perspective with which I am most 
familiar. 
                         
     2 Two examples in this respect come readily to mind: the development of merger guidelines (and 
especially the market delineation paradigm for antitrust analysis of mergers -- see the discussion in 
Section V below), and the development of "corporate leniency" policies that encourage cartel 
participants to break ranks and reveal the existence of the cartel to enforcement authorities. 
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 II. What is Competition Policy? 
 Competition policy can be defined generally as a set of policies and instruments that are 
intended to encourage competition in markets and to encourage the allocative efficiency that 
generally accompanies competition.  Competition policy broadly encompasses efforts at: 
 - Preventing cartels or other joint efforts at price-fixing (or market allocation, or agreements 
on product attributes); 
 - Preventing mergers where the consequences would be a significant lessening of 
competition (or a strengthening of whatever market power may already be present); and 
 - Preventing unilateral actions by a seller where the consequence would be a significant 
enhancement of the seller's market power.3 
 In the U.S., these policies are enunciated in the Sherman Act of 1890, the Clayton Act of 
1914, and the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 (and subsequent amendments to these Acts) 
and in a rich history of clarifying court decisions.4 
 It should be readily admitted that not all policies that have the descriptor "competition 
policy" are in fact competition-enhancing and/or efficiency-enhancing.  In the U.S., for example, at 
various times populism and anti-bigness have been important themes of American "antitrust" policy, 
which have led to legislation and legal decisions that favored the preservation of small businesses for 
their own sake rather than focusing on the competition-efficiency nexus.5  Misguided concerns about 
                         
     3 Although competition policy is usually framed in terms of actions by and market power created 
or enhanced by one or more sellers, the same principles can be applied to actions by buyers. 
     4 Overviews of the U.S. antitrust laws and court cases can be found in various antitrust law texts, 
such as Areeda and Hovenkamp (2004), Areeda, Kaplow, and Edlin (2004), Sullivan and 
Hovenkamp (1999), Sullivan and Grimes (2006), and Hovenkamp (1999a, 1999b, 2005) and in 
economics writings, such as Kwoka and White (1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009) and Buccirossi 
(2007). 
     5 The Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 (which was an amendment to the Clayton Act and was 
intended to inhibit manufacturer price discrimination that would favor large retailers and chains; it is 
still intact) and the Miller-Tydings Act of 1937 (which authorized states to legalize resale price 
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vertical mergers and vertical restraints (such as tying, exclusive dealing, territorial allocation, and 
resale price maintenance) have impeded effective competition as well as efficiency.6 
 Nevertheless, most modern interpretations of competition policy would describe it in terms 
of the three broad policy thrusts mentioned above. 
                                                                  
maintenance, at the behest of small retailers -- especially pharmacists -- who feared the lower prices 
of retail chains; it was repealed in 1975) are notable pieces of "antitrust" legislation that were 
expressly designed to favor small business.  The decisions by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) 
and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to block mergers in the 1960s, supported by a string of 
Supreme Court decisions -- most notably Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294 (1962) -- were 
clearly aimed more at bigness itself than at realistic concerns about effective competition. 
     6 See, for example, White (1989) and Kwoka and White (1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, and 2009). 
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 III. Policies That Promote Economic Growth 
 There are an array of policies that can contribute to the promotion of economic growth in a 
country.7  As will be seen, competition policy is both a direct contributor in its own right, as well as 
an indirect contributor through the enhancement of other policies.  In considering this array of 
policies, the best perspective is to consider that there are tradeoffs among them. 
A. Encouraging saving. 
 Higher rates of saving -- the setting aside of resources that otherwise could have been 
consumed and that are instead devoted to investment -- clearly are a contributor (cet. par.) to 
economic growth.  Among the things that can encourage saving are sensible tax policies, efficient 
financial markets (which competition policy can help support), a legal system that embodies 
property rights (so that savers can be assured that they will retain the fruits of their saving) and a 
general "rule of law" (so that savers more generally have reasonable levels of certainty as to the 
consequences of their actions), and favorable cultural influences. 
B. Encouraging efficient deployment of savings: investment. 
 Efficient investment will yield greater output payoffs and thus enhance economic growth.  
Among the things that can encourage more efficient investments are sensible tax policies, sensible 
regulatory policies, property rights and the rule of law, efficient financial markets, and efficient 
markets generally (so that investors receive efficient price signals to guide their investments).  
Competition policy clearly can contribute to the last two of these influences. 
C. Encouraging productivity improvements and innovation. 
 Since most of economic growth appears to come from something more than just the 
accumulation of greater amounts of labor and capital in production processes,8 encouraging 
                         
     7 The literature on the components of economic growth is vast and cannot be surveyed here.  
Some interesting evidence can be found, for example, in King and Levine (1993a, 1993b), La Porta 
et al. (1997, 1998), and Levine (1997, 1998, 1999). 
     8 See, for example, Solow (1957, 1988). 
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productivity improvements and innovation is important for growth.  Among the things that can 
encourage productivity improvements and innovation are sensible tax policies, an effective 
intellectual property rights regime (so that innovators can appropriate at least some of the gains from 
their innovation), policies to encourage saving and investment (since investments in new capital 
goods are often the vehicle for productivity improvements), policies to encourage education and 
investments in human capital, and efficient markets (which will send the correct price signals so as 
to encourage efficient innovation).  Again, competition policy can play a role with respect to this last 
element. 
 What about Schumpeter?  It is clear that Joseph Schumpeter's notion of "creative 
destruction" -- major "paradigm changing" innovations that disrupt and destroy existing markets and 
in their stead create new markets -- has a role to play in economic growth.  The revolutionary 
improvements in data processing, electronics, and telecommunications over the past few decades are 
testaments to this power.  But the conditions that Schumpeter thought were necessary for such 
improvements -- large enterprises (so as to take advantage of economies of scale in research and 
development and in the exploitation of the advances emerging from the R&D) that also had 
monopoly market positions (so as to be able to appropriate the fruits of the R&D process) -- do not 
appear to be required and indeed may stifle innovation rather than encourage it.9  Although an 
economy filled solely with atomistic competitors would likely also not be ideal for encouraging 
innovation -- some scale is required, and surely the distinctiveness that goes with branding (as well 
as the property rights that accompany patents, copyright, and trademarks) is also important -- there is 
a broad intermediate range of competitive market structures that should be conducive to innovation.  
                         
     9 In Schumpeter's defense, he saw large enterprises as capable of such wide-ranging innovation 
that he envisioned any monopoly position that an enterprise might gain as largely temporary, since 
innovations by enterprises outside of any market were likely to allow the innovators to enter those 
markets and thus thwart any existing monopoly (but then -- temporarily --create a new monopoly, 
which would then be undone by further outside innovation, etc.).  See Schumpeter (1950). 
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Also, it appears that the incremental improvements that often follow a major breakthrough may be at 
least as important in the measurement of overall productivity improvements.10 
D. Encourage entrepreneurship. 
 In addition to product and process innovation as a technological phenomenon, the 
encouragement of entrepreneurship -- especially the entrepreneurship that accompanies innovation -- 
is another contributor to economic growth.  Among the things that enhance entrepreneurship are 
favorable cultural conditions, sensible tax policies, educational policies, the rule of law, and 
competitive markets generally (again, so that entrepreneurs are responding to the right price signals). 
 Competition policy can clearly contribute to this last element. 
E. Encourage efficient markets. 
 Efficient markets have been mentioned repeatedly as supporting the other contributors to 
economic growth.  But efficient markets deserve a mention also as a direct contributor, since an 
economic system with the correct price signals will be one in which firms are encouraged to make 
decisions not only with respect to static efficiency but also with respect to the investment and R&D 
decisions that lead to economic growth.  Openness to international trade is one important contributor 
to efficient markets.  And competition policy, by directly encouraging efficient (competitive) 
markets and also by being a "cultural" influence that encourages other government policies (such as 
regulatory policies) to be oriented toward markets and competitive outcomes, clearly has an 
important role to play in this respect.11 
                         
     10 For overviews of the "point and counter-point" with respect to the Schumpeterian arguments, 
see, for example, Scherer (1984), Cohen and Levin (1989), Scherer and Ross (1990, ch. 17), and 
Cohen (1995). 
     11 In the U.S., for example, for over 30 years the DOJ and the FTC have had "competitive 
advocacy" programs, whereby they "lobby" other federal agencies and the 50 state governments to 
pursue regulatory policies that are more oriented toward markets and competitive outcomes. 
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 IV. What about "Industrial Policy"? 
 "Industrial policy" often stands in juxtaposition with competition policy as the means by 
which governments can promote economic growth.  Although industrial policy, especially in the 
U.S., was more actively debated during the 1970s and 1980s, it has not disappeared from the policy 
debate.12  Accordingly, some discussion of industrial policy is worthwhile.13 
A. What is industrial policy? 
 To start, unlike competition policy, there is no standard definition or general agreement on 
the meaning of the term "industrial policy".  Consider the following: 
 -- "Industrial policy refers to a set of measures taken by a government and aiming at 
influencing a country's performance towards a desired objective." (Pitelis 2006, p. 435) 
 -- "Industrial policy means the initiation and coordination of governmental activities to 
leverage upward the productivity and competitiveness of the whole economy and of particular 
industries in it." (Johnson 1984, p. 8) 
 -- "'Industrial policy' refers to all policies designed to affect the allocation of resources 
between and within sectors of the economy." (Lawrence 1986, p.126) 
 -- "... the term industrial policy indicates the relationship between business and government 
on a microeconomic level..." (Wachter and Wachter 1981, p. 1) 
 -- "Industrial policies are concerned with promoting industrial growth and efficiency." 
(OECD 1975, p. 7) 
 At these broad levels of generalities, every country has an "industrial policy".  After all, 
governments in all countries have policies that affect the relationships between business and 
government, that affect the allocation of resources, and that have some objective, often couched in 
                         
     12 See, for example, Bianchi and Labory (2006). 
     13 Further discussion can be found in White (2008a). 
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terms of efficiency, productivity, and/or growth. 
 Now consider the following: 
 -- "In current use, the term 'industrial policy' denotes the promotion of specific industrial 
sectors rather than industrialization overall... Industrial policies are direct, micro, and selective; they 
are an attempt by government to influence the decision making of companies or to alter market 
signals; thus they are discriminating... Industrial policy has sometimes sought to support the losers, 
delaying or retarding their decline; in other cases the goal is to succor or catalyze maturing sectors or 
to stimulate advancing sectors." (Driscoll and Behrman 1984, p. 5) 
 This last definition comes closest to the general sense of "industrial policy", of which a 
condensed version is often expressed as "the government's picking winners and losers".  But in the 
discussion that follows I make references to both the broader descriptions of industrial policy above 
and the narrower version just discussed. 
B. The tensions between competition policy and industrial policy. 
 Industrial policy -- whether considered as the general governmental intervention in markets 
or as the specific "picking winners and losers" -- is basically at odds with competition policy.  The 
latter has a markets orientation; the former does not. 
 The U.S. experience is instructive.  Though the U.S. does not have a formal industrial policy 
in the sense of Behrman and Driscoll (1984), it certainly has a patchwork of intervention policies 
that would satisfy the Lawrence (1986) description.  First there are the formal exemptions from the 
reach of the antitrust laws, including:14 
 - Agricultural and fishing cooperatives; 
 - Insurance; 
 - Export associations; 
 - Cooperative research joint ventures; 
                         
     14 This list can be found in AMC (2007). 
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 - Newspaper joint ventures; 
 - Ocean shipping conferences; and 
 - Professional baseball. 
 Next, there are a range of federal government actions that are at odds with the spirit of the 
antitrust laws, including: 
 - International trade restrictions (tariffs, quotas, subsidies, etc.); 
 - International investment restrictions; 
 - "Buy American" policies for government procurement (including, but not limited to, 
defense procurement); 
 - Government technological development programs that favor U.S.-based companies; 
 - Agricultural policies that subsidize and protect domestic farmers and that inhibit 
competition; and 
 - Tax and subsidy policies that favor some industries over others.15 
 Further, although less prevalent today than a few decades ago, there are formal federal 
regulatory regimes for transportation industries (air, rail, truck, pipelines), telecommunications 
(telephony and broadcasting), energy (electricity, natural gas), and finance (banking and securities).  
In such instances, antitrust policy is superseded by a broader and more vague "public interest" 
standard that often justifies anticompetitive regulatory restrictions. 
 Finally, the 50 states have often (although, again, less today than a few decades ago) placed 
anticompetitive restrictions on a number of industries, including: 
 - Banking; 
 - Intra-state trucking; 
 - Intra-state long-distance telephone service; 
                         
     15 A current example of this type of policy, with all of its inefficient consequences, is U.S. policy 
toward corn-based ethanol production as a substitute for petroleum as a motor fuel. 
  
 
 11
 - Insurance; 
 - Licensing of occupations and professions; 
 - Local taxicab service; and 
 - Health care. 
 There are, of course, legitimate "market failure" arguments for modifying market outcomes.  
These include problems of significant spillovers or externalities (positive or negative) and significant 
information asymmetry problems.  Competition policy should not be expected to encompass 
remedies for these types of problems, so additional policies are warranted.  However, "industrial 
policy" interventions -- though their supporters sometimes invoke the rhetoric of externalities or 
information asymmetries -- are usually (at base) primarily about rent-seeking and income 
redistribution.  And even when policies truly are aimed at dealing with externalities (such as 
environmental pollution problems), rent-seeking often inhibits the development of programs that 
would encourage competition and enhance efficiency.16  Despite their recent popularity, "cap and 
trade" programs (which do encourage efficiency and competition) are still the exception rather than 
the rule for the U.S. 
 In the 1970s and 1980s, as economic growth slowed (and Japan's economic strength seemed 
based on its adoption of a formal industrial policy17), the U.S. seriously debated the possibility of 
embracing a more formal version of industrial policy (as compared with the patchwork of policies 
described above)-- but declined the opportunity.  Indeed, this was a period of significant movement 
in the opposite direction: the economic deregulation of industries that had been subject to the formal 
regulatory regimes mentioned above.18  As a consequence, the domain of markets and of the 
                         
     16 See, for example, Ackerman and Hassler (1981). 
     17 See, for example, Behrman (1984), Johnson (1982, 1984), and McCraw (1986). 
     18 See, for example, Joskow and Rose (1989), Joskow and Noll (1994), and Winston (1993, 
1998). 
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application of the antitrust laws is wider today than was true of the 1930s or even of the early 1970s. 
 Nevertheless, the tensions remain between antitrust policy and that patchwork of intervention that 
continues to characterize U.S. (industrial) policy. 
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 V. Advances in Competition Policy 
 Competition policy should not be static, and in the U.S. it has not been static.  In the past two 
to three decades, especially, American antitrust policy has accommodated new economics thinking 
and new forms of analysis -- much for the good.  This section will first summarize the ways in which 
economics and economists have influenced U.S. antitrust policy.  Next, three specific important 
advances in (relatively) recent antitrust policy that have been greatly influenced by economics will 
be discussed.  Finally, four areas that still need improvements (and to which economics could likely 
contribute) will be outlined.19 
A. The influence of economics and economists. 
 The influence of economics and economists on antitrust in the U.S. has occurred through 
three broad channels. 
 1. The development of microeconomics thought.  The economics foundation for antitrust 
policy has been microeconomics generally and industrial organization (IO) economics more 
specifically.  IO economics has its origins in work by Edward Mason and his colleagues and 
students in the late 1930s and early 1940s in developing the structure-conduct-performance (S-C-P) 
paradigm as a theoretical proposition and then providing empirical tests of the theory.20  Data and 
monographs from the Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC) in the late 1930s helped in 
this endeavor. 
 Over the following few decades the S-C-P tradition was strengthened by further theoretical 
and empirical developments, and it began to influence antitrust policy.  In the 1950s, however, a 
second strand of IO economics developed at the University of Chicago, under the leadership of 
Aaron Director.21  This approach was more skeptical of the S-C-P paradigm, more sympathetic to 
                         
     19 More detail on all of the topics in this section can be found in White (2008b). 
     20 See Shepherd (2007) and De Jong and Shepherd (2007). 
     21 See Peltzman (2005, 2007). 
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vertical restraints, and more supportive of unhindered market outcomes. 
 In recent decades both strands of IO thinking have clearly influenced U.S. antitrust policy.  
Some specific influences will be discussed in Part B below. 
 2. Direct employment of economists by the enforcement agencies.  Economists have been 
directly employed by the enforcement agencies in the U.S. for over 100 years.  The U.S. Bureau of 
Corporations, which was established in 1903 and which had economists on its staff, provided 
valuable research support for some of the early and important antitrust victories by the DOJ.  When 
the FTC was created in 1914, its Economic Department (which eventually became today's Bureau of 
Economics (BE)) inherited the Bureau of Corporation's research and investigative role, as well as 
absorbing its specific office accommodations and personnel (including economists). 
 Until the 1960s, however, economists at both agencies were largely in roles of simple 
litigation support, with few opportunities to participate in the development of case theories and the 
formulation of policy.  But in the 1960s the tide began to turn.  At the DOJ, Donald Turner (the 
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust in the mid 1960s, who had a Ph.D. in economics as well as 
a law degree) established the position of Special Economic Assistant to the Assistant Attorney 
General and attracted a series of young IO economists to serve one-year terms in the position.22  At 
the FTC, the BE was able to attract Ph.D.-trained IO economists as Bureau Directors.23  But little 
was done to strengthen the quality and authority of the permanent economics staff at either agency.  
Reviews of both agencies at the end of the 1960s commented unfavorably on the quality and role of 
the economics staffs at the agencies.24 
 Beginning in the 1970s, however, concerted efforts were made to improve the quality of the 
                         
     22 See Williamson (2003). 
     23 See Mueller (2004). 
     24 See ABA (1968), Posner (1971a), and Green (1972). 
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economists at both agencies, as well as to increase their numbers.  These efforts have continued to 
the present time.  As of early 2008, the DOJ has 60 Ph.D.-level economists, headed by a Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General who is usually a leading academic IO economist and who typically 
serves for two years in the position.  At the FTC, the BE is staffed by 70 Ph.D.-level economists 
(although they spend about a quarter of their time on consumer protection issues), and the Bureau 
Director is usually a leading academic IO economist who spends about two years in the position. 
 3. Economists' participation in and writing about specific antitrust cases. 
 The participation of economists in antitrust cases extends back at least to the second decade 
of the twentieth century, when the DOJ used an economist (who had been a Deputy Commissioner 
in the Bureau of Corporations) as an expert witness at trial in its case against U.S. Steel.25  But the 
use of economists was not widespread over the next few decades, nor were economists apparently 
especially interested in writing about antitrust cases. 
 With the development of the IO paradigm in the late 1930s and the 1940s, however, IO 
economists began to take an interest in major antitrust cases, at least as outside observers, and to 
write about them.  An antitrust symposium in the May 1949 "Papers and Proceedings" issue of the 
American Economic Review provides an example of this newly developed interest.26  An important 
instance of direct participation occurred when Carl Kaysen, in 1950 as a Ph.D. student of Edward 
Mason's, was appointed as a law clerk by Federal District Court Judge Charles Wyzanski, to provide 
economic counseling to Judge Wyzanski in the DOJ's monopolization trial of the United Shoe 
Machinery Company.  Kaysen served for two years in that position and wrote a lengthy report for 
Judge Wyzanski, which subsequently became Kaysen's Ph.D. dissertation and a book-length 
                         
     25 The Supreme Court ultimately decided that case in favor of U.S. Steel and cited disparagingly 
the testimony that had been offered at trial by that economist.  See U.S. v. United States Steel Corp., 
223 F. Rep. 55, 251 U.S. 417 (1920). 
     26 See Adelman (1949), Nicholls (1949), and Nicols (1949). 
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monograph.27 
 By the 1970s economists were actively participating in antitrust cases more frequently as 
consultants and as expert witnesses, and then writing about those cases.  The IBM28 and AT&T29 
cases, which were large and lengthy DOJ cases with some accompanying private cases as well, 
provided fertile opportunities for such participation and subsequent writings, but other suits and 
investigations also proved sufficiently interesting to yield publications.30  Since the 1970s 
economists' participation in antitrust litigation has become substantially more frequent31 -- rare is the 
major antitrust case today that does not have one or more economists engaged on both sides -- and 
articles reflecting that participation also continue to appear.32 
B. Important advances in U.S. antitrust policy. 
 There are three33 areas of U.S. antitrust policy where economists' achievements in helping 
                         
     27 See Kaysen (1956).  The case was U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 
(1953), 347 U.S. 521 (1954). 
     28 Discussion of this case, which was filed by the DOJ in 1969 and was dropped in 1982, can be 
found, for example, in Fisher et al. (1983), DeLamarter (1986), Houthakker (1999), and Brock 
(1989). 
     29 The Case was filed by the DOJ in 1974 and was settled with a consent decree in 1982 on terms 
that were highly favorable to the basic goals of the DOJ.  Discussion of the case can be found, for 
example, Evans (1983) and Noll and Owen (1994). 
     30 White (2008b) provides an array of examples. 
     31 See, for example, Kovacic (1992), FTC (2003), and Barnett (2007). 
     32 See, for example, Kwoka and White (1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009). 
     33 There is a fourth area in which U.S. antitrust policy has changed for the better: strategic 
leniency for the first member of a price-fixing cartel or agreement that comes forward with sufficient 
evidence to convict the other members.  Though the DOJ had a policy of corporate leniency that was 
initiated in 1978, it applied only if the DOJ had not yet opened an investigation.  Since a potential 
confessor often would not know if an investigation had been opened, this uncertainty discouraged 
confessions.  In 1993 the DOJ revised the policy so that a confessor with important knowledge could 
still receive leniency even if an investigation had been opened.  That clarification, plus the 
announcement itself, which freshly promoted the availability of leniency, converted it into an 
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bring changes are especially noteworthy: merger analysis, vertical relationships and restraints, and 
predatory pricing.34 
 1. Merger analysis.  Almost all of modern antitrust merger analysis takes as its starting point 
the DOJ-FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines.  The Guidelines -- first published in 198235 and 
subsequently revised in 1987, 1992, and 1997 -- were strongly influenced by economics thinking 
and by the inputs of economists at the agencies. 
 The Guidelines establish two approaches under which a merger might be deemed to have 
anticompetitive consequences: "coordinated effects" and "unilateral effects". 
 a. Coordinated effects.  This is a direct application of the S-C-P model, with some special 
emphases derived from the writings of George Stigler.36  The primary concern is that the 
oligopolistic sellers in the market, post-merger, will be able better to coordinate their behavior 
implicitly so as to achieve higher prices (or to effect other changes in conduct variables) and higher 
profits.  Seller concentration is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and occupies 
center stage (as it does in the S-C-P model) for at least two reasons:  First, seller concentration is the 
                                                                  
important tool.  Although economists were surely supportive of the strategy -- after all, it is 
consistent with the basic structure of the "prisoner's dilemma" approach to understanding incentives 
in a cartel-like situation -- it is unclear that economics and economists were as directly involved in 
the change as is the case for the three advances discussed in the text.  For further discussion of the 
leniency program, see White (2003), Harrington (2006), and Wils (2007). 
     34 In addition to the major achievements in the text, "honorable mention" for antitrust economists 
might include: (a) being early advocates of the economic deregulation of the securities and banking 
markets, transportation markets, telecommunications markets, and energy markets; (b) being major 
advocates for larger fines and the continuation of treble damages in private antitrust suits as 
instruments for deterrence; and (c) being major advocates for the repeal of the Robinson-Patman 
Act. 
     35 An earlier set of DOJ Guidelines were published in 1968 but proved unsatisfactory and were 
largely scrapped when the 1982 Guidelines were adopted. 
     36 See, especially, Stigler (1964). 
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most readily measured structural attribute; and, second, the immediate effect of any horizontal 
merger is to increase seller concentration. 
 The Guidelines also bring into the analysis the other important features of the S-C-P 
paradigm: conditions of entry; the buyer side of the market; the nature and complexity of the 
product; the transparency of price and of other market information; and the antitrust history of the 
sellers in the market. 
 A particular problem of implementing merger enforcement prior to 1982 had been the issue 
of defining the relevant product and geographic markets.  The S-C-P model is silent on this issue; 
the model simply assumes that an appropriate market has been specified, so that the market shares of 
the leading sellers provide a meaningful indication of the likelihood that the sellers (post-merger) 
will collectively exercise market power.  The model provides no guidance with respect to 
delineating the market itself. 
 The Guidelines address this problem in the following way:37  A relevant market is a product 
or group of products that are sold by a group of sellers who, if they acted in concert (i.e., if they 
acted as a "hypothetical monopolist"), could achieve a "small but significant and nontransitory 
increase in price" (SSNIP); that SSNIP is designated in the Guidelines as 5% for one year.  This 
"SSNIP test" is equivalent to defining a relevant market as one in which market power can be 
exercised (or one in which market power can be enhanced).  The smallest group of sellers that 
satisfy the SSNIP test is usually designated as the relevant market, although sometimes a larger 
market is chosen.  These principles apply equally validly to the delineation of product markets and 
of geographic markets.  In essence, the determining factor is whether a sufficient number of buyers 
would switch away to other sellers -- sellers of other goods and/or sellers that are located in other 
geographic areas -- so as to thwart the price increase. 
 The logic of the SSNIP test approach follows from the goal of preventing mergers that could 
                         
     37 As Werden (2003) has pointed out, this approach was first proposed by Adelman (1959). 
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create or enhance market power.  The SSNIP test identifies the smallest group of sellers that could 
exercise such power.38 
 This market definition paradigm has proved enduring, and merger enforcement authorities in 
other countries have adopted similar approaches. 
 b. Unilateral effects.  The 1992 revision to the Merger Guidelines added "unilateral effects" 
as a second area of concern with respect to the antitrust analysis of mergers.  Under this approach, 
the worry would be that a significant post-merger price increase could occur solely because of the 
actions of the merged entity, without the need for implicit coordination among the other (non-
merging) firms.  This unilateral increase could occur if the two merging firms produced products 
that were moderately close substitutes for each other -- but not perfect substitutes -- and a significant 
number of the customers of one or both of the firms had as their runner-up choice the products of the 
merger partner.  If the products of all other firms were distant enough "third choices" for these 
customers, then the merged entity could well find a general price increase to be worthwhile -- and 
the price increase would be even more likely if the merged firm could identify and target these 
"trapped" customers and thereby practice selective price discrimination against them.39 
 The anticompetitive effects of this type of merger do not arise because of cooperation or 
collusion among the firms that are situated alongside the merged entity in this differentiated market. 
 Instead, the competitive harm occurs because the merged firm is better able to internalize the 
                         
     38 With one exception, the market definition paradigm focuses on sellers, since it is sellers that 
can exercise market power.  That exception arises when a group of sellers may be able to practice 
price discrimination and raise prices significantly toward an identifiable group of buyers (who may 
be identified by, say, a specific geographic area or a specific business function).  In such instances, 
that group of buyers may also be considered to be a relevant market. 
     39 Unilateral effects could also occur if a dominant firm merged with one of its rivals, even in a 
homogeneous goods industry; see Stigler (1965).  The post-merger concentration level and the 
merger-induced change in concentration from such a merger would probably trigger enforcement 
action in any event; but, to be on the safe side, the Guidelines also indicate that any merger involving 
a firm that has a market share of 35% or higher will receive special scrutiny. 
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benefits of a price increase.  For this analysis, the issues of market definition and of market shares 
are largely irrelevant; what matters is the extent to which customers have the two merging firms as 
their first and second choices and also the extent to which all other firms are distant third choices. 
 2. Vertical relationships and restraints. 
 The "Harvard" IO tradition that produced the S-C-P paradigm was (at least prior to the 
1970s) largely hostile toward vertical relationships (including vertical mergers between a supplier 
and a customer) and vertical restraints, such as tying, bundling, exclusive dealing, requirements 
contracts, full-line forcing, territorial restraints, and resale price maintenance (RPM).40  This 
approach saw these vertical relationships and restrictions either as manifestations of market power or 
as instruments for the enhancement of the exercise of market power.41 
 The "Chicago" IO tradition, however, by the late 1950s was offering an alternative and far 
more benign view of these vertical relationships and restraints.  Although acknowledging that they 
could sometimes be used for the purposes of cartel formation, the Chicago-oriented writers instead 
emphasized the efficiency-enhancing aspects of these practices.42 
 Consistent with the harsh "Harvard" view, the antitrust enforcement agencies and the 
                         
     40 See, for example Kaysen and Turner (1959), which had a generally negative view of virtually 
everything vertical. 
     41 At least part of the reason for many economists' harsh view of RPM was the experience of the 
1930s, when small retailers (and especially pharmacists) lobbied politically for protection against 
"unfair" competition from large chain stores.  One legislative reaction that has already been noted 
above was the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, which strengthened the Clayton Act's prohibitions on 
price discrimination; the small retailers alleged that the chain stores were unfairly extracting 
discounts from manufacturers (and thus benefiting from favorable price discrimination) that were 
unavailable to smaller retailers.  Another response -- the Miller-Tydings Act of 1937 -- authorized 
the states to legalize RPM (which also went by the phrase "fair trade"), so that the small retailers 
could convince manufacturers to impose RPM and thus force the large chain stores to sell at the 
same retail prices as the smaller retailers.  The Miller-Tydings Act was repealed in 1975. 
     42 See, for example, Bowman (1955, 1957, 1973), Telser (1960), Burstein (1960a, 1960b), 
Marvel (1982, 1985), and Marvel and McCafferty (1984, 1985, 1986). 
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Supreme Court (in its antitrust legal decisions) prior to the mid 1970s were generally hostile toward 
vertical mergers and vertical restraints.  From the mid 1970s onward, however, the enforcement 
agencies and the Supreme Court moved to a far more benign view of these practices -- recognizing 
potential anticompetitive possibilities but also recognizing the efficiency-enhancing possibilities.43  
As of early 2008, the enforcement agencies are far more cautious in their choice of cases for 
prosecution, and the Supreme Court has declared that almost all vertical restraints should be judged 
under a "rule of reason" approach, where potential benefits are weighed against potential 
anticompetitive effects,44 rather than under a "per se" approach, where a practice is automatically 
condemned and the plaintiff need only show that the defendant did actually engage in the alleged 
practice.45 
 3. Predatory pricing.  Prior to the 1970s the antitrust authorities and the courts were unduly 
concerned about predatory pricing (as well as about price discrimination, where predation claims 
often were lurking).46  Common to enforcement actions and to judicial decisions were allegations of 
"pricing below cost", where "below cost" was either vaguely defined or was defined as below 
average costs -- which, for any multi-product firm, also meant using some arbitrary method of 
distributing joint costs across multiple products, such as using the relative sales revenues of the 
various products as the relative weights. 
                         
     43 An important turning point was the Supreme Court's decision in  Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE 
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).  See Preston (1994) for a discussion. 
     44 The most recent case in this tradition is Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 
127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007), in which the Supreme Court declared that RPM should be judged under a 
"rule of reason" standard. 
     45 As of early 2008, the one exception to this "rule of reason" approach is tying, where the 
Supreme Court has nominally kept a "per se" illegality standard.  Even in this area, however, the 
Court has insisted that the plaintiff show that the defendant has market power before the "per se" 
condemnation will apply. 
     46 For a critique, see Areeda and Turner (1975). 
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 Academic work to clarify predatory issues, and to cast doubt on the empirical frequency of 
predation, began at "Chicago" in the late 1950s.47  The paradigm of envisioning predation as an 
"investment" (an initial sacrifice) and then a subsequent recoupment period (higher prices permitting 
a profits return on the initial investment) became clear.  As part of this paradigm, it also became 
clear that barriers to entry were a necessary component for success of this strategy; otherwise, entry 
would foil the predator's recoupment efforts; and to the extent that a would-be predator faced 
conditions of easy entry, attempted predation would not be a rational strategy.48 
 Building on this base, Areeda and Turner offered a powerful critique of existing legal 
thought and court decisions and offered a proposal that pricing at or above marginal cost (with 
average variable cost serving as a proxy for the usually unmeasurable marginal cost) should 
generally be considered as a "safe harbor" for firms that were being accused of engaging in 
predatory pricing.  This proposal subsequently became known as the "Areeda-Turner rule".49 
 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions were clearly influenced by the investment-plus-
recoupment paradigm and the price-above-marginal-cost test.50 
                         
     47 See, for example, McGee (1958), Telser (1966), and Peltzman (2005). 
     48 But, as is pointed out below, one or more attempts at predation, even if unsuccessful, might 
create a reputation for "aggressive" behavior by the price-cutter that would effectively discourage 
entry and/or would discipline rivals that might otherwise be inclined to be "mavericks". 
     49 See Areeda and Turner (1975).  Recall that Turner had a Ph.D. in economics as well as a law 
degree, so that this proposal can be considered as part of the contribution of economists toward 
improved antitrust policy.  Elaborations on and extensions of the Areeda-Turner rule can be found in 
Scherer (1976), Williamson (1977), Baumol (1979), Joskow and Klevorick (1979), Ordover and 
Willig (1981), and Brodley and Hay (1981). 
     50 See Matsushita Electric Industrial Corp., Ltd., et al. v. Zenith Radio Corp., et al., 475 U.S. 574 
(1986); Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., U.S. (1993); and most recently 
in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc. 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007).  See 
also Elzinga (1999) and Burnett (1999) for discussions of the Matsushita and Brooke Group cases, 
respectively. 
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 At about the same time that economists in the antitrust area were clarifying notions of 
predation, economists in regulatory areas were writing about similar issues in the domain of price 
regulation and were nudging regulatory criteria and regulatory decisions away from the use of fully 
distributed costing methods (i.e., the process of allocating joint costs in some arbitrary fashion across 
multiple products) and instead toward the use of incremental costs.51 
C. Important improvements that are still needed in U.S. antitrust policy. 
 Antitrust policy in the U.S. has certainly not reached "nirvana".  Improvements are still 
needed, so as to bring antitrust policy even more closely in line with economic efficiency (and 
economic growth), and economists can surely contribute to the development of these improvements. 
 There are at least four areas that are worth exploring: 
 1. Taking efficiencies into account in merger cases.  The analytical basis for taking into 
account the tradeoffs between the potential efficiencies that a merger may offer and the loss of 
welfare that the heightened market power of the merger may create has been known for at least 40 
years.52  But efficiency improvements from a merger are easy to promise but may be difficult 
actually to deliver; and "unscrambling the eggs" of a merger a few years after it has been approved 
and the promised efficiencies have failed to arrive may be difficult or impossible.  In addition, even 
the measurement of whether the promised efficiencies have actually appeared may be difficult. 
 Perhaps creative economics thinking can yield an incentive-compatible mechanism for 
inducing the merger proponents to provide their best estimate of the prospective efficiency gains 
from the proposed merger rather than providing just their wishful thinking or their fanciful efforts to 
offset the concerns of the enforcement agencies as to the adverse consequences of the possible 
exercise of market power. 
                         
     51 See, for example, Baumol (1968) and Baumol and Walton (1973). 
     52 See Williamson (1968). 
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 2. A more nuanced approach to unilateral predatory behavior.  As was discussed above, 
current antitrust decisions portray predation as a narrow strategy of an initial investment in below-
marginal-cost pricing followed by a recoupment period of higher prices and profits after the target 
firm departs from the market.  Lost in this approach are strategic issues that extend beyond the 
immediate market and time period.  For example, the would-be predator may not recoup its 
investment solely in this market and this time period.  Suppose, for example, that by pricing its 
product at levels that are below marginal costs the firm gets a reputation for being overly aggressive. 
 In this case, other firms might be more reluctant to enter during the attempted recoupment period; in 
essence, the predatory act itself might raise barriers to entry.  Or this bout of predatory behavior 
might chasten or "discipline" firms that might otherwise become "maverick" price-cutters, thereby 
yielding higher long-run profits for the initiating firm.  Or the predatory behavior in one (product or 
geographic) market may gain the firm a reputation for being aggressive that pays off in other 
markets through reduced entry or disciplined behavior in those other markets.53 
 Further, the narrow investment-plus-recoupment paradigm has proved difficult to apply to 
allegations of non-price predatory behavior (e.g., expansions of capacity or applications of various 
kinds of vertical restraints).54  And the issue of "bundled discounts" and whether they constitute a 
serious problem of predation is currently roiling antitrust discussion in the U.S.55 
 Clear economics thinking can surely help in this area.  One promising line of thought that 
                         
     53 See Brodley et al. (2000) for an elaboration on these strategic motives for pricing below 
marginal costs. 
     54 See, for example, the discussion of the DOJ's failed case against American Airlines' alleged 
predatory behavior vis-a-vis start-up airlines -- U.S. v. AMR Corp., American Airlines, Inc., and 
American Eagle Holding Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (2001); 335 F.3d 1109 (2003) -- in Edlin and 
Farrell (2004). 
     55 The case that precipitated this discussion is LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (2003); see 
Roberts (2009) for a discussion.  It is noteworthy that the AMC (2007) Report devoted a relatively 
large amount of space to a discussion of this issue. 
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should be pursued is the concept of "no economic sense": that a price or non-price action should be 
condemned as predatory (i.e., as anticompetitive) if it made no economic sense for the firm 
undertaking it unless the target firm disappeared from the market or would otherwise be 
disciplined.56 
 3. Market definition in monopolization cases.  As was discussed above, for antitrust merger 
analysis the Merger Guidelines have embodied a robust paradigm for market definition.  
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for monopolization cases.  The crucial difference is that the 
antitrust analysis in merger cases is asking a prospective question -- will this merger create or 
enhance market power? -- so that the "SSNIP test" is the appropriate question.  By contrast, in most 
monopolization cases the usual allegation is that the defendant already has market power, and the 
plaintiff wants the court to enjoin the defendant from acts (e.g., vertical restraints, or predatory 
pricing) that have allowed it to achieve or enhance that market power and/or enjoy the fruits of that 
market power.  The defendant, of course, will deny that it has market power. 
 In this context, the SSNIP test cannot be used, because neither a truly competitive firm nor a 
true monopolist would find it worthwhile to raise its price from its current level (at which, 
presumably, it is already maximizing its profits).57  Prior to the 1980s, accounting profitability 
measures would have been offered as support for the existence of market power.  But substantial 
                         
     56 See, for example, Ordover and Willig (1981, 1999) and Werden (2006).  It should be noted that 
this line of argument does not encompass the strategic reputation issues raised above. 
     57 To apply the SSNIP test would be to commit the "cellophane fallacy", named after the 
Supreme Court's analytical error in U.S. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (1953), 
351 U.S. 377 (1956).  In that case, the DOJ alleged that du Pont was exercising market power in the 
cellophane market.  In response, du Pont argued that it had no market power, because cellophane 
should properly be considered to be part of a much broader "flexible wrapping materials" market.  
Both the district court and the Supreme Court agreed with du Pont by -- in essence -- applying the 
SSNIP test:  Those decisions concluded that du Pont did not possess market power since any attempt 
by it to raise the price of cellophane from existing levels would be thwarted (and thus would be 
unprofitable) by the switching of too many cellophane purchasers away to other flexible wrapping 
materials. 
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doubt was subsequently cast on the use of accounting profitability measures as indicators of market 
power,58 and accounting measures of profitability have been used much more sparingly since then in 
antitrust cases.  Perhaps creative thinking can yield a paradigm breakthrough in this area, as it did for 
mergers.59 
 4. Determining the appropriate stringency for antitrust merger policy.  Are the DOJ and the 
FTC drawing the right "lines" as to the decisions with regard to which mergers should be challenged 
and which should be approved?  The general proposition -- based on the S-C-P paradigm -- that 
higher levels of seller concentration (and higher barriers to entry, etc.) increase the likelihood of the 
exercise of market power has strong empirical support.60 Nevertheless, it is clear that there are low 
levels of seller concentration at which the likelihoods of post-merger market power are quite low, 
and thus mergers among sellers would be harmless from a market power perspective and could 
create efficiencies -- and enhance economic growth -- and therefore should be approved; and there 
are high levels of seller concentration at which the likelihoods of the post-merger exercise (or 
enhancement) of market power are high and the prevention of mergers is consistent with the 
maintenance of overall market efficiency.  But where should the appropriate line(s) be drawn, and is 
current merger policy at the right place? 
 The answers to these questions cannot be learned from examining the number of merger 
challenges per year, or examining the characteristics of the mergers that were challenged or of the 
mergers that were successfully challenged (since one can never know the "counter-factual" with 
respect to these mergers).  But post-merger pricing studies of those mergers that are allowed to 
proceed -- especially the "close calls" -- should yield interesting information.  These "close calls" 
                         
     58 See Benston (1982), Fisher et al. (1983), Fisher and McGowan (1983), and Fisher (1987). 
     59 See White (2008c) for an elaboration on this problem and for some suggestions. 
     60 See, for example, the survey and support in White (2006). 
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would reasonably be represented by those mergers in which the merger partners are asked by the 
enforcement agencies for additional information61 but the mergers are eventually permitted to 
proceed.  If the studies indicate that post-merger prices tend to increase significantly (cet. par.), then 
merger policy has been too lax and should be tightened (e.g., by lowering the HHI threshold at 
which a merger is likely to be challenged); if the studies indicate that post-merger prices do not rise, 
then merger policy may be too stringent (or might be "just right"). 
 The DOJ and the FTC have the pre-merger data that would provide the baselines for these 
studies; they would be in the best positions to do the post-merger follow-up studies; and the 
economists in those agencies would surely be the most qualified personnel to do the statistical 
(econometric) work that would be necessary. 
                         
     61 In U.S. antitrust parlance, these are termed "second requests". 
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 VI. Conclusion 
 It is clear that competition policy has an important role to play in the promotion of economic 
growth in a modern economy; but that role should neither over-sold not under-sold.  Competition 
policy is not a magical cure-all for anything that ails an economic system; and there are clearly other 
important influences on the growth rate of a modern economy.  Nevertheless, competition policy 
clearly does play an important role: directly, because of competition policy's emphasis on 
competitive markets and the efficiencies that flow therefrom, which surely encourage economic 
growth; and indirectly, because of the "markets" mindset that accompanies competition policy and 
because competition policy can encourage efficient financial markets, which in turn encourage the 
saving and efficient investment that themselves are important contributors to growth. 
 Good competition policy, unfortunately, is not an automatic choice for many economies.  
"Industrial policy", with its underlying foundation resting on the belief that the government can 
somehow better pick winners and losers than can markets, often stands counterpoised to the markets 
orientation of competition policy.  Although the problems of significant externalities and asymmetric 
information often do justify extra-market interventions by government (since competition policy is 
simply not equipped to handle such "market failure" problems), the course of industrial policy 
usually goes far beyond such remedying interventions (although the proponents of industrial policy 
may sometimes wrap their arguments in the language of market failures).  The powerful rent-seeking 
and political capture models of modern political economy are a better explanation for what really 
lies at the base of industrial policy.62  Competition policy and industrial policy are thus likely to 
continue to stand in tension with each other as modern economies develop and mature. 
 Good competition policy should not stay stagnant but should adapt as circumstances change 
and especially as economics thinking evolves.  In the U.S. there has been a substantial history of the 
influence of economics and economists on antitrust policy, most of it for the good.  Economics and 
                         
     62 See, for example, Posner (1971b, 1974), Stigler (1971), and Peltzman (1976). 
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economists clearly have contributed to three specific and important antitrust accomplishments in 
recent decades: improved antitrust merger analysis, improved antitrust treatment of vertical mergers 
and vertical restraints, and improved understanding of predatory pricing.  But there are still 
important advances and adaptations in antitrust policy to which economics and economists can 
surely contribute, so as to make competition policy an even better contributor to economic growth. 
 As is true in many other policy areas, the tasks of good competition policy economists are 
never finished. 
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